Notfallwarnung im Mobilfunknetz + Cell Broadcast

[excuse this German-language post, this is targeted at the current German public discourse]

In mehrerern Gegenden Deutschlands gab es verheerende Hochwasser, und die Öffentlichkeit diskutiert deshalb mal wieder die gute alte Frage nach dem adäquaten Mittel der Alarmierung der Bevölkerung.

Es ist einfach nur ein gigantisches Trauerspiel, wie sehr die Deutsche Politik und Verwaltung in diesem Punkt inzwischen seit Jahrzehnten sämtliche relevanten Standards verpennt, und dann immer wieder öffentlich durch fachlich falsche und völlig uninformierte Aussagen auffällt.

Das Thema wurde vor dem aktuellen Hochwasser bereits letztes Jahr im Rahmen des sog. WarnTag öffentlich diskutiert. Auch hier von Seiten der öffentlichen Hand ausschliesslich mit falschen Aussagen, wie z.B. dass es bei Cell Broadcast Datenschutzprobleme gibt. Dabei ist Cell Broadcast die einzige Technologie, wo keine Rückmeldung des einzelnen Netzteilnehmers erfolgt, und das Netz nichtmal weiss, wer die Nachricht empfangen hat, und wo dieser Empfang stattgefunden hat. Ganz wie beim UKW-Radio.

Fakt ist, dass alle digitalen Mobilfunkstandards seit GSM/2G, d.h. seit 1991 die Möglichkeit mitbringen, effizient, schnell und datensparsam alle Nutzer (einer bestimmten geographischen Region) mit sogenannten broadcast Nachrichten zu informieren. Diese Technik, in GSM/2G genannt Cell Broacast (oder auch _SMSCB_), unterscheidet sich Grundlegend von allen anderen Kommunikationsformen im Mobilfunknetz, wie Anrufe und herkömmliche SMS (offiziell SMS-PP). Anrufe, SMS und auch mobile Paketdaten (Internet) werden immer für jeden Teilnehmer individuell auf ihm zugewiesenen Funkressourcen übermittelt. Diese Ressourcen sind beschränkt. Es können in keinem Mobilfunknetz der Welt alle Teilnehmer gleichzeitig telefonieren, oder gleichzeitig SMS empfangen.

Stattdessen benutzt Cell Broadcast - wie der Name bereits unmissverständlich klar macht - Einen broadcast, d.h. Rundsendemechanismus. Eine Nachricht wird einmal gesendet, benötigt also nur eine geteilte Ressource auf der Luftschnittstelle, und wird dann von allen Geräten im Empfangsbereich zeitgleich empfangen und dekodiert. Das ist wie UKW-Radio oder klassisches terrestrisches Fernsehen.

Cell Broadcast wurde bereits in den 1990er Jahren von Deutschen Netzbetreibern benutzt. Und zwar nicht für etwas lebensnotwendiges wie die Notfallsignalisierung, sondern für so banale Dinge wie die Liste jener Vorwahlen, zu denen gerade ein vergünstigter "wandernder Ortstarif" Besteht. Ja, sowas gab es mal bei Vodafone. Oder bei O2 wurden über lange Zeit (aus unbekannten Gründen) die GPS-Koordinaten der jeweiligen Basisstation als Cell Broadcast versendet.

In der folgenden (nun fast abgeschalteten) Mobilfunkgeneration 3G wurde Cell Broadcast leicht umbenannt als Service Area Broadcast beibehalten. Schliesslich gibt es ja Länder mit - anders als in Deutschland - funktionierender und kompetenter Regulierung des Telekommunikationsmarktes, und die langjährig bestehenden gesetzlichen Anforderungen solcher Länder zwingen die Netzbetreiber und auch die Ausrüster der Neztbetreiber, neue Mobilfunkstandards so zu entwickeln, dass die gesetzlichen Vorgaben bzgl. der Alarmierung der Bevölkerung im Notfall funktioniert.

Im Rahmen dieser Standardisierung haben eine Reihe von Ländern innerhalb der 3GPP-Standardisierung (zuständig für 2G, 3G, 4G, 5G) sogenannte Public Warning Systems (PWS) standardisiert. Zu diesen gehören z.B. das Japanische ETWAS (Earthquake and Tsunami Warning System), das Koreanische KPAS (Korean Public Alerting System), das US-Amerikanische WEA (Wireless Emergency Alerts, früher bekannt als CMAS) und auch das EU-ALERT mit den nationalen Implementationen NL-ALERT (Niederlande) und UK-ALERT (Großbritannien) sowie RO-ALERT (Rumänien).

Die zahlreichen Studien und Untersuchungen, die zur Gestaltung obiger Systeme und der internationalen Standards im Mobilfunk geführt haben, weisen auch nochmal nach, was sowieso vorher jedem Techniker offensichtlich erscheint: Eine schelle Alarmierung aller Teilnehmer (einer Region) kann nur über einen Broadcast-Mechanismus erfolgen. In Japan war die Zielvorgabe, die Alarmierung in Erdbebenfällen innerhalb von weniger als 4 Sekunden an die gesamte betroffene Bevölkerung zu übertragen. Und das ist mit PWS möglich!

Die relevanten PWS-Standards in 2G/3G/4G/5G bieten jede Menge nützliche Funktionen:

  • Benachrichtigung in bestimmten geographischen Regionen

  • Interoperable Schnittstellen, so dass Netzwerkelemente unterschiedlicher Hersteller miteinander kommunizieren

  • Konfigurierbare Benachrichtigungstexte, nicht nur in der primären Landessprache, sondern auch in mehreren anderen Sprachen, die dann automatisch je nach Spracheinstellung des Telefons wiedergegeben werden

  • Unterschiedliche Schweregrade von Alarmierungen

  • Übermittlung nicht nur im Broadcast, sondern auch im Unicast an jeden Teilnehmer, der gerade in einem Telefongespräch ist, und dessen Telefon gerade währenddessen aus technischen Gründen den Broadcast nicht empfangen würde

  • Unterschied zwischen Wiederholung einer Übertragung ohne Änderung des Inhalts und einer übertragung mit geändertem Inhalt

Es gibt also seit vielen Jahren internationale Standards, wie sämtliche heute eingesetzten Mobilfunktechniken zur schnellen, effizienten und datensparsamen Alarmierung der Bevölkerung eingesetzt werden können.

Es gibt zahlreiche Länder, die diese Systeme seit langem einsetzen. Das US-Amerikanische WEA wurde nach eigenen Angaben seit 2012 bereits mehr als 61.000 Mal benutzt, um Menschen vor Unwetter oder anderen Katastrophen zu warnen.

Sogar innerhalb der EU hat man das EU-ALERT System spezifiziert, welches weitgehend mit dem amerikanischen WEA identisch ist, und auf die gleichen Techniken aufbaut.

Und dann gibt es Länder wie Deutschland, die es seit genauso vielen Jahren vermissen lassen, durch Gesetze oder Vorschriften

  1. die Netzbetreiber zum Betrieb dieser Broadcast-Technologien in ihrem Netz verpflichtet

  2. die Netzbetreiber zur Bereitstellung von standardisierten Schnittstellen gegenüber den Behörden wie Zivilschutz / Katastrophenschutz zu verpflichten, so das diese selbständig über alle Netzbetreiber Warnungen versenden können

  3. die Gerätehersteller z.B. über Vorschriften des FTEG (Gesetz über Funkanlagen und Telekommunikationsendeinrichtungen) zu Verpflichten, die PWS-Nachrichten anzuzeigen

In den USA, dem vermeintlich viel mehr dem Freien Markt und dem Kapitalismus anhängenden System ist all dies der Regulierungsbehörde FCC möglich. In Deutschland mit seiner sozialen Marktwirtschaft ist es anscheinend unmöglich, den Markt entsprechend zu regulieren. Eine solche Regulierung schafft man in Deutschland nur für wirklich wichtige Themen wie zur Durchsetzung der Bereitstellung von Schnittstellen für die Telekommunikationsüberwachung. Bei so irrelevanten Themen wie dem Katastrophenschutz und der Alarmierung der Bevölkerung braucht man den Markt nicht zu regulieren. Wenn die Netzbetreiber kein PWS anbieten wollen, dann ist das einfach so Gottgegeben, und man kann da ja nichts machen.

Falls jemand sich SMSCB und PWS technisch näher ansehen will: In 2019 haben wir im Osmocom-Projekt eine Open Source Implementation des kompletten Systems von BTS über BSC bis zum CBC, sowie der dazwischen befindlichen Protokolle wie CBSP vorgenommen. Dies wurde freundlicherweise durch den Prototype Fund mit EUR 35k finanziert. Ja, so günstig kann man die nötige Technik zumindest für eine einzelne Mobilfunkgeneration entwickeln...

Man kann also in einem selbst betriebenen Labor-Mobilfunknetz, welches auf Open Source Software basiert mehr in Punkt standardkonformer Notfallalarmierung, als die Deutsche Politik, Verwaltung und Netzbetreiber zusammen hinbekommen.

Wir haben in Deutschland Leute, die diese Standards in und auswendig kennen, sogar daran mitgearbeitet haben. Wir haben Entwickler, die diese Standards implementiert haben. Aber wir schaffen es nicht, das auch mal selbst praktisch zu benutzen - das überlassen wir lieber den anderen Ländern. Wir lassen lieber zuerst die ganze Katastrophenalarmierung mittels Sirenen vergammeln, machen den Netzbetreibern keine Vorgaben, entwicklen komische Apps, die Anwender extra installieren müssen, die prinzipbedingt nicht skalieren und beim Test (WarnTag) nicht funktionieren.

Was für eine Glanzleistung für den hochentwickelten Techhologie-Standort Deutschland.

36C3 Talks on SIM card technology / Mitel DECT

At 36C3 in December 2019 I had the pleasure of presenting: One full talk about SIM card technology from A to Z and another talk where I presented together with eventphone team members about Security issues in the Mitel SIP-DECT system.

The SIM card talk was surprisingly successful, both in terms of a full audience on-site, as well as in terms of the number of viewers of the recordings on media.ccc.de. SIM cards are a rather niche topic in the wider IT industry, and my talk was not covering any vulnerabilities or the like. Also, there was nothing novel in the talk: SIM cards have been around for decades, and not much has changed (except maybe eSIM and TLS) in recent years.

In any case, I'm of course happy that it was well received. So far I've received lots of positive feedback.

As I'm working [more than] full time in cellular technology for almost 15 years now, it's sometimes hard to imagine what kind of topics people might be interested in. If you have some kind of suggestion on what kind of subject within my area of expertise you'd like me to talk about, please don't hesitate to reach out.

The Mitel DECT talk also went quite well. I covered about 10 minutes of technical details regarding the reverse engineering of the firmware and the communication protocols of the device. Thanks again to Dieter Spaar for helping with that. He is and remains the best reverse engineer I have met, and it's always a privilege to collaborate on any project. It was of course also nice to see what kind of useful (and/or fun) things the eventphone team have built on top of the knowledge that was gained by protocol-level reverse engineering.

If you want to know more low-level technical detail than the 36C3 talk, I recommend my earlier talk at the OsmoDevCon 2019 about Aastra/Mitel DET base station dissection.

If only I had more time, I would love to work on improving the lack of Free / Open Source Software realted to the DECT protocol family. There's the abandoned deDECTed.org, and the equally abandoned dect.osmocom.org project. The former only deals with the loewst levels of DECT (PHY/MAC). The latter is to a large extent implemented as part of an ancient version of the Linux kernel (I would say this should all run in userspace, like we run all of GSM/UMTS/LTE in userspace today).

If anyone wants to help out, I still think working on the DECT DLC and NWK dissectors for wireshark is the best way to start. It will create a tool that's important for anyone working with the DECT protocols, and it will be more or less a requirement for development and debugging should anyone ever go further in terms of implementing those protocols on either the PP or FP side. You can find my humble beginnings of the related dissectors in the laforge/dect branch of osmocom.org/wireshark.git.

Retronetworking / BBS-Revival setup at #36C3

After many years of being involved in various projects at the annual Chaos Communication Congress (starting from the audio/vidoe recording team at 15C3), I've finally also departed the GSM team, i.e. the people who operate (Osmocom based) cellular networks at CCC events.

The CCC Camp in August 2019 was slightly different: Instead of helping an Osmocom based 2G/3G network, I decided to put up a nextepc-based LTE network and make that use the 2G/3G HLR (osmo-hlr) via a newly-written DIAMETER-to-GSUP proxy. After lots of hacking on that proxy and fixing various bugs in nextepc (see my laforge/cccamp2019 branch here) this was working rather fine.

For 36C3 in December 2019 I had something different in mind: It was supposed to be the first actual demo of the retronetworking / bbs-revival setup I've been working on during past months. This setup in turn is sort-of a continuation of my talk at 34C3 two years ago: BBSs and early Intenet access in the 1990ies.

Rather than just talking about it, I wanted to be able to show people the real thing: Actual client PCs running (mainly) DOS, dialling over analog modems and phone lines as well as ISDN-TAs and ISDN lines into BBSs, together with early Interent access using SLIP and PPP over the same dial-up lines.

The actual setup can be seen at the Dialup Network In A Box wiki page, together with the 36C3 specific wiki page.

What took most of the time was - interestingly - mainly two topics:

  1. A 1U rack-mount system with four E1 ports. I had lots of old Sangoma Quad-E1 cards in PCI form-factor available, but wanted to use a PC with a more modern/faster CPU than those old first-generation Atom boxes that still had actual PCI slots. Those new mainboards don't have PCI but PCIe. There are plenty of PCIe to PCI bridges and associated products on the market, which worked fine with virtually any PCI card I could find, but not with the Sangoma AFT PCI cards I wanted to use. Seconds to minutes after boot, the PCI-PCIe bridges would always forget their secondary bus number. I suspected excessive power consumption or glitches, but couldn't find anything wrong when looking at the power rails with a scope. Adding additional capacitors on every rail also didn't change it. The !RESET line is also clean. It remains a mystery. I then finally decided to but a new (expensive) DAHDI 4-port E1 PCIe card to move ahead. What a waste of money if you have tons of other E1 cards around.

  2. Various trouble with FreeSWITCH. All I wanted/needed was some simple emulation of a PSTN/ISDN switch, operating in NT mode towards both the Livingston Portmaster 3 RAS and the Auerswald PBX. I would have used lcr, but it supports neither DAHDI nor Sangoma, but only mISDN - and there are no mISDN cards with four E1 ports :( So I decided to go for FreeSWITCH, knowing it has had a long history of ISDN/PRI/E1 support. However, it was a big disappointment. First, there were some segfaults due to a classic pointer deref before NULL-check. Next, libpri and FreeSWITCH have a different idea how channel (timeslot) numbers are structured, rendering any call attempt to fail. Finally, FreeSWITCH decided to blindly overwrite any bearer capabilities IE with 'speech', even if an ISDN dialup call (unrestricted digital information) was being handled. The FreeSWITCH documentation contains tons of references on channel input/output variables related to that - but it turns out their libpri integration doesn't set any of those, nor use any of them on the outbound side.

Anyway, after a lot more time than expected the setup was operational, and we could establish modem calls as well as ISDN dialup calls between the clients and the Portmaster3. The PM3 in turn then was configured to forward the dialup sessions via telnet to a variety of BBSs around the internet. Some exist still (or again) on the public internet. Some others were explicitly (re)created by 36C3 participants for this very BBS-Revival setup.

My personal favorite was finding ACiD Underworld 2.0, one of the few BBSs out there today who support RIPscrip, a protocol used to render vector graphics, text and even mouse-clickable UI via modem connection to a DOS/EGA client program called RIPterm. So we had one RIPterm installation on Novell DOS7 that was just used for dialling into ACiD Underworld 2.0.

Among other things we also tested interoperability between the 1980ies CCC DIY accoustic coupler "Datenklo" and the Portmaster, and confirmed that Windows 2000 could establish multilink-PPP not only over two B-channels (128 kbps) but also over 3 B-Channels (192).

Running this setup for four days meant 36C3 was a quite different experience than many previous CCC congresses:

  • I was less stressed as I wasn't involved in operating a service that many people would want to use (GSM).

  • I got engaged with many more people with whom I would normally not have entered a conversation, as they were watching the exhibits/demos and we got to chat about the technology involved and the 'good old days'.

So all in all, despite the last minute FreeSWITCH-patching, it was a much more relaxing and rewarding experience for me.

Special thanks to

  • Sylvain "tnt" Munaut for spending a lot of time with me at the retronetworking assembly. The fact that I had an E1 interface around was a good way for him to continue development on his ICE40 based bi-directional E1 wiretap. He also helped with setup and teardown.

  • miaoski and evanslify for reviving two of their old BBSs from Taiwan so we could use them at this event

The retronetworking setup is intended to operate at many other future events, whether CCC related, Vintage Computing or otherwise. It's relatively small and portable.

I'm very much looking forward to the next incarnations. Until then, I will hopefully have more software configured and operational, including a variety of local BBSs (running in VMs/containers), together with the respective networking (FTN, ZConnect, ...) and point software like CrossPoint.

If you are interested in helping out with this project: I'm very much looking for help. It doesn't matter if you're old and have had BBS experience back in the day, or if you're a younger person who wants to learn about communications history. Any help is appreciated. Please reach out to the bbs-revival@lists.osmocom.org mailing list, or directly to me via e-mail.

Software Freedom Podcast #3 about Free Software mobile phone communication

Recently I had the pleasure of being part of the 3rd incarnation of a new podcast series by the Free Software Foundation Europe: The Software Freedom Podcast.

In episode 3, Matthias and Bonnie of the FSFE are interviewing me about various high-level topics related to [the lack of] Free Software in cellular telephony, as well as some of the projects that I was involved in (Openmoko, Osmocom).

We've also touched the current mainstream / political debate about Huawei and 5G networks, where my position can only be summarized as: It doesn't matter much in which country the related proprietary software is being developed. What we need is Free / Open Source software that can be publicly audited, and we need a method by which the operator can ensure that a given version of that FOSS software is actually executing on his equipment.

Thanks to the FSFE for covering such underdeveloped areas of Free Software, and to use their podcast to distribute related information and ideas.

Sometimes software development is a struggle

I'm currently working on the firmware for a new project, an 8-slot smart card reader. I will share more about the architecture and design ideas behind this project soon, but today I'll simply write about how hard it sometimes is to actually get software development done. Seemingly trivial things suddenly take ages. I guess everyone writing code knows this, but today I felt like I had to share this story.

Chapter 1 - Introduction

As I'm quite convinced of test-driven development these days, I don't want to simply write firmware code that can only execute in the target, but I'm actually working on a USB CCID (USb Class for Smart Card readers) stack which is hardware-independent, and which can also run entirely in userspace on a Linux device with USB gadget (device) controller. This way it's much easier to instrument, trace, introspect and test the code base, and tests with actual target board hardware are limited to those functions provided by the board.

So the current architecture for development of the CCID implementation looks like this:

  • Implement the USB CCID device using FunctionFS (I did this some months ago, and in fact developing this was a similarly much more time consuming task than expected, maybe I find time to expand on that)

  • Attach this USB gadget to a virtual USB bus + host controller using the Linux kernel dummy_hcd module

  • Talk to a dumb phoenix style serial SIM card reader attached to a USB UART, which is connected to an actual SIM card (or any smart card, for that matter)

By using a "stupid" UART based smart card reader, I am very close to the target environment on a Cortex-M microcntroller, where I also have to talk to a UART and hence implement all the beauty of ISO 7816-3. Hence, the test / mock / development environment is as close as possible to the target environment.

So I implemented the various bits and pieces and ended up at a point where I wanted to test. And I'm not getting any response from the UART / SIM card at all. I check all my code, add lots of debugging, play around with various RTS / DTR / ... handshake settings (which sometimes control power) - no avail.

In the end, after many hours of trial + error I actually inserted a different SIM card and finally, I got an ATR from the card. In more than 20 years of working with smart cards and SIM cards, this is the first time I've actually seen a SIM card die in front of me, with no response whatsoever from the card.

Chapter 2 - Linux is broken

Anyway, the next step was to get the T=0 protocol of ISO 7816-3 going. Since there is only one I/O line between SIM card and reader for both directions, the protocol is a half-duplex protocol. This is unlike "normal" RS232-style UART communication, where you have a separate Rx and Tx line.

On the hardware side, this is most often implemented by simply connecting both the Rx and Tx line of the UART to the SIM I/O pin. This in turn means that you're always getting an echo back for every byte you write.

One could discard such bytes, but then I'm targeting a microcontroller, which should be running eight cards in parallel, at preferably baud-rates up to ~1 megabit speeds, so having to read and discard all those bytes seems like a big waste of resources.

The obvious solution around that is to disable the receiver inside the UART before you start transmitting, and re-enable it after you're done transmitting. This is typically done rather easily, as most UART registers in hardware provide some way to selectively enable transmitter and/or receiver independently.

But since I'm working in Linux userspace in my development environment: How do I approximate this kind of behavior? At least the older readers of this blog will remember something called the CREAD flag of termios. Clearing that flag will disable the receiver. Back in the 1990ies, I did tons of work with serial ports, and I remembered there was such a flag.

So I implement my userspace UART backend and somehow it simply doesn't want to work. Again of course I assume I must be doing something wrong. I'm using strace, I'm single-stepping through code - no avail.

In the end, it turns out that I've just found a bug in the Linux kernel, one that appears to be there at least ever since the git history of linux-2.6.git started. Almost all USB serial device drivers do not implement CREAD, and there is no sotware fall-back implemented in the core serial (or usb-serial) handling that would discard any received bytes inside the kernel if CREAD is cleared. Interestingly, the non-USB serial drivers for classic UARTs attached to local bus, PCI, ... seem to support it.

The problem would be half as much of a problem if the syscall to clear CREAD would actually fail with an error. But no, it simply returns success but bytes continue to be received from the UART/tty :/

So that's the second big surprise of this weekend...

Chapter 3 - Again a broken card?

So I settle for implementing the 'receive as many characters as you wrote' work-around. Once that is done, I continue to test the code. And what happens? Somehow my state machine (implemented using osmo-fsm, of course) for reading the ATR (code found here) somehow never wants to complete. The last byte of the ATR always is missing. How can that be?

Well, guess what, the second SIM card I used is sending a broken, non-spec compliant ATR where the header indicates 9 historical bytes are present, but then in reality only 8 bytes are sent by the card.

Of course every reader has a timeout at that point, but that timeout was not yet implemented in my code, and I also wasn't expecting to hit that timeout.

So after using yet another SIM card (now a sysmoUSIM-SJS1, not sure why I didn't even start with that one), it suddenly works.

After a weekend of detours, each of which I would not have assumed at all before, I finally have code that can obtain the ATR and exchange T=0 TPDUs with cards. Of course I could have had that very easily if I wanted (we do have code in pySim for this, e.g.) but not in the architecture that is as close as it gets to the firmware environment of the microcontroller of my target board.

Fernvale Kits - Lack of Interest - Discount

Back in December 2014 at 31C3, bunnie and xobs presented about their exciting Fernvale project, how they reverse engineered parts of the MT6260 ARM SoC, which also happens to contain a Mediatek GSM baseband.

Thousands (at least hundreds) of people have seen that talk live. To date, 2506 people (or AIs?) have watched the recordings on youtube, 4859 more people on media.ccc.de.

Given that Fernvale was the closest you could get to having a hackable baseband processor / phone chip, I expected at least as much interest into this project as we received four years earlier with OsmocomBB.

As a result, in early 2015, sysmocom decided to order 50 units of Fernvale DVT2 evaluation kits from bunnie, and to offer them in the sysmocom webshop to ensure the wider community would be able to get the boards they need for research into widely available, inexpensive 2G baseband chips.

This decision was made purely for the perceived benefit of the community: Make an exciting project available for anyone. With that kind of complexity and component density, it's unlikely anyone would ever solder a board themselves. So somebody has to build some and make it available. The mark-up sysmocom put on top of bunnie's manufacturing cost was super minimal, only covering customs/import/shipping fees to Germany, as well as minimal overhead for packing/picking and accounting.

Now it's almost four years after bunnie + xobs' presentation, and of those 50 Fernvale boards, we still have 34 (!) units in stock. That means, only 16 people on this planet ever had an interest in playing with what at the time I thought was one of the most exciting pieces of equipment to play with.

So we lost somewhere on the order of close to 3600 EUR in dead inventory, for something that never was supposed to be a business anyway. That sucks, but I still think it was worth it.

In order to minimize the losses, sysmocom has now discounted the boards and reduced the price from EUR 110 to to EUR 58.82 (excluding VAT). I have very limited hope that this will increase the amount of interest in this project, but well, you got to try :)

In case you're thinking "oh, let's wait some more time, until they hand them out for free", let me tell you: If money is the issue that prevents you from playing with a Fernvale, then please contact me with the details about what you'd want to do with it, and we can see about providing them for free or at substantially reduced cost.

In the worst case, it was ~ 3600 EUR we could have invested in implementing more Osmocom software, which is sad. But would I do it again if I saw a very exciting project? Definitely!

The lesson learned here is probably that even a technically very exciting project backed by world-renowned hackers like bunnie doesn't mean that anyone will actually ever do anything with it, unless they get everything handed on a silver plate, i.e. all the software/reversing work is already done for them by others. And that actually makes me much more sad than the loss of those ~ 3600 EUR in sysmocom's balance sheet.

I also feel even more sorry for bunnie + xobs. They've invested time, money and passion into a project that nobody really seemed to want to get involved and/or take further. ("nobody" is meant figuratively. I know there were/are some enthusiasts who did pick up. I'm talking about the big picture). My condolences to bunnie + xobs!

Wireshark dissector for 3GPP CBSP - traces wanted!

I recently was reading 3GPP TS 48.049, the specification for the CBSP (Cell Broadcast Service Protocol), which is the protocol between the BSC (Base Station Controller) and the CBC (Cell Broadcast Centre). It is how the CBC according to spec is instructing the BSCs to broadcast the various cell broadcast messages to their respective geographic scope.

While OsmoBTS and OsmoBSC do have support for SMSCB on the CBCH, there is no real interface in OsmoBSC yet on how any external application would instruct it tot send cell broadcasts. The only existing interface is a VTY command, which is nice for testing and development, but hardly a scalable solution.

So I was reading up on the specs, discovered CBSP and thought one good way to get familiar with it is to write a wireshark dissector for it. You can find the result at https://code.wireshark.org/review/#/c/29745/

Now my main problem is that as usual there appear to be no open source implementations of this protocol, so I cannot generate any traces myself. More surprising is that it's not even possible to find any real-world CBSP traces out there. So I'm facing a chicken-and-egg problem. I can only test / verify my wireshark dissector if I find some traces.

So if you happen to have done any work on cell broadcast in 2G network and have a CBSP trace around (or can generate one): Please send it to me, thanks!

Alternatively, you can of course also use the patch linked above, build your own wireshark from scratch, test it and provide feedback. Thanks in either case!

Still alive, just not blogging

It's been months without any update to this blog, and I feel sad about that. Nothing particular has happened to me, everything is proceeding as usual.

At the Osmocom project we've been making great progress on a variety of fronts, including

  • 3GPP LCLS (Local Call, Local Switch)

  • Inter-BSC hand-over in osmo-bsc

  • load Based hand-over in osmo-bsc

  • reintroducing SCCPlite compatibility to the new BSC code in osmo-bsc / libosmo-sigtran

  • finishing the first release of the SIMtrace2 firmware

  • extending test coverage on all fronts, particularly in our TTCN-3 test suites

  • tons of fixes to the osmo-bts measurement processing / reporting

  • higher precision time of arrival reporting in osmo-bts

  • migrating osmocom.org services to new, faster servers

At sysmocom, next to the Osmocom topics above, we've

  • made the sysmoQMOD remote SIM firmware much more robust and reliable

  • after months of delays, finally SIMtrace2 hardware kits are available again

  • created autoamtic testing of pySim-prog and sysmo-usim-util

  • extended our osmo-gsm-tester based automatic testing setup to include multi-TRX nanoBTS setups

In terms of other topic,

  • my wife and I have been to a three week motorbike tour all over the Alps in July

  • I've done tons of servicing (brake piston fittings, brake tubes, fuel line, fixing rust/paint, replacing clutch cable, choke cable, transmission chain, replacing several rusted/worn-out needle bearings, and much more) on my 22year old BMW F650ST to prepare it for many more yers to come. As some type-specific spare parts (mostly plastic parts) are becoming rarer, it was best to take care of replacements sooner than later

  • some servicing/repairs to my 19 year old Audi A4 car (which passed German mandatory inspection without any deficiency at the first attempt!)

  • some servicing of my Yamaha FZ6

  • repaired my Fairphone 2 by swapping the microphone module (mike was mute)

  • I've re-vamped a lot of the physical/hardware infrastructure for gnumonks.org and other sites I run, which was triggered by having to move racks